



fflonK for the Polygon zkEVM

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Joint work with Polygon zkEVM

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April 4th 2023 - Lisbon


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Statistics of the Polygon zkEVM Circuit

Some interesting numbers for the circuit C attesting the validity of a batch (≈ 500 standard) of transactions:

a) Polynomials:

1. Total number of polynomials: **1276**.
2. Number of witness polynomials: **1058**.
3. Number of preprocessed polynomials: **218**.
4. Degree's bound of polynomials: $n = 2^{23}$.

b) Constraints:

5. Number of AIR constraints: 631 (with degree's bound of $3n$).
6. Number of inclusion constraints: 28.
7. Number of connection constraints: 2.
8. Number of multiset equality constraints: 18.

Working over the prime field \mathbb{F}_p with $p = 2^{64} - 2^{32} + 1$, this means that:

The (non-encoded) execution trace is around **86GB**.

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
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SNARKs for the Polygon zkEVM

- To generate a SNARK for this gigantic circuit C we need a very **fast prover**.
- Since the proof will be verified on-chain, we have also required a **small proof size** and a **fast verifier**.
- **Solution:** Compose a SNARK \mathcal{I} that features a fast prover with another SNARK \mathcal{O} that boasts a small proof size and a fast verifier.
- We chose eSTARK¹ (very fast prover, but long proof size) for \mathcal{I} and fflonK (slow prover, but constant proof size and verification time) for \mathcal{O} .



¹This proving system is precisely the STARK proving system with support for arguments.

SNARKs with Constant Proof Size and Verification Time

| Scheme | Universal TS | CRS/SRS Size | Proving Time | Proof Size | Ver. Time |
|---------------|--------------|-----------------------------------|--|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Groth16 | ✗ | $3m + w \mathbb{G}_1$ | $3m + w - \ell \mathbb{G}_1, m \mathbb{G}_2$ | $2 \mathbb{G}_1, 1 \mathbb{G}_2$ | $\ell \mathbb{G}_1, 3 \mathbb{P}$ |
| <i>PlonK</i> | ✓ | $3n \mathbb{G}_1, 2 \mathbb{G}_2$ | $11n \mathbb{G}_1$ | $7 \mathbb{G}_1, 7 \mathbb{F}$ | $16 \mathbb{G}_1, 2 \mathbb{P}$ |
| <i>fflonK</i> | ✓ | $9n \mathbb{G}_1, 2 \mathbb{G}_2$ | $35n \mathbb{G}_1$ | $4 \mathbb{G}_1, 15 \mathbb{F}$ | $5 \mathbb{G}_1, 2 \mathbb{P}$ |

- m denotes the number of multiplication gates.
- w denotes the number of wires.
- n denotes the number of gates.
- ℓ denotes the number of public inputs ($\ell = 1$ in our case).
- \mathbb{G}_i denotes scalar multiplications in \mathbb{G}_i .
- \mathbb{P} denotes pairings.

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| Groth16 | \times | $3m + w \mathbb{G}_1$ | $3m + w - \ell \mathbb{G}_1, m \mathbb{G}_2$ | $2 \mathbb{G}_1, 1 \mathbb{G}_2$ | ≈ 232.000 gas |
| <i>PlonK</i> | \checkmark | $3n \mathbb{G}_1, 2 \mathbb{G}_2$ | $11n \mathbb{G}_1$ | $7 \mathbb{G}_1, 7 \mathbb{F}$ | ≈ 285.000 gas |
| <i>fflonK</i> | \checkmark | $9n \mathbb{G}_1, 2 \mathbb{G}_2$ | $35n \mathbb{G}_1$ | $4 \mathbb{G}_1, 15 \mathbb{F}$ | ≈ 185.000 gas |

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Proof System Diagram




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
Why fflonK in the zkEVM?

The PCS of fflonK : c-shplonK

Implementation Details and fflonK^-

What is a Polynomial Commitment Scheme (PCS)? i

Given the polynomial family $\mathcal{F} = \mathbb{F}_{<d}[X]$ of polynomials of degree lower than d with coefficients over a finite field \mathbb{F} , a PCS works as follows:



What is a Polynomial Commitment Scheme (PCS)? ii

Definition 1

A Polynomial Commitment Scheme (PCS) is a tuple $(\text{setup}, \text{commit}, \text{open})$ such that:

- $\text{setup}(1^\lambda) = \text{gp}$. Outputs the public **group parameters** gp .
- $\text{commit}(\text{gp}, f, r) = \text{com}_f$. Outputs a commitment to $f \in \mathcal{F}$ with² $r \in \mathbb{F}$.
- $\text{open}(\text{gp}, f, x, y)$ is a (public coin) protocol between \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} such that:
 1. $\mathcal{P}(\text{gp}, f, x, y) = \pi$.
 2. $\mathcal{V}(\text{gp}, \text{com}_f, x, y, \pi) = \text{accept/reject}$.

In *open* is turned non-interactive, then a PCS is a (zk-)SNARK for the statement:

“I know an $f \in \mathcal{F}$ such that $f(x) = y$ and $\text{commit}(\text{gp}, f, r) = \text{com}_f$.”

²The commitment scheme is statistically binding and computationally hiding, but r can be used to make it computationally binding and statistically hiding.

Example of PCS: KZG

setup(1^λ): The setup algorithm works by sampling a random $s \in \mathbb{F}$, computing $gp = ([1]_1, [s]_1, \dots, [s^{d-1}]_1, [1]_2, [s]_2)$ and **deleting** s .

The Prover $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{F}, f)$

$\text{commit}(gp, f, r) = f(s)\mathbb{G}_1 := [f(s)]_1$

$\xrightarrow{[f(s)]_1}$

\xleftarrow{x}

Computes $f(x) = y$,

the polynomial $q(X) = \frac{f(X) - y}{X - x}$,

and the proof $\pi := [q(s)]_1$.

$\xrightarrow{y, [q(s)]_1}$

The Verifier $\mathcal{V}(\mathcal{F})$

Samples an evaluation challenge $x \in \mathbb{F}$

Outputs accepts if:

$e([q(s)]_1, [s]_2 - [x]_2) = e([f(s)]_1 - [y]_1, [1]_2)$,
rejecting otherwise.

Properties of KZG

- The algorithm **setup**(1^λ) requires to be trusted on deleting s .
- \mathcal{P} runs in $O(d)$ since it computes:
 - a) The MSM $f(s)\mathbb{G}_1 = f_0 \cdot [1]_1 + f_1 \cdot [s]_1 + \dots + f_{d-1} \cdot [s^{d-1}]_1$.
 - b) The division $q(X) = (f(X) - y)/(X - x)$.
 - c) The MSM $q(s)\mathbb{G}_1 = q_0 \cdot [1]_1 + q_1 \cdot [s]_1 + \dots + q_{d-2} \cdot [s^{d-2}]_1$.
- The proof π consists of a single \mathbb{G}_1 -element.
- \mathcal{V} runs in $O(1)$ time since it computes 2 pairings.
- It can be made zero-knowledge by masking f with r [ZGK⁺18].
- Direct generalizations: **batch openings, multiple polynomials and both**.

Simple KZG Generalizations

Batch Openings: Open f at x_1, \dots, x_m .

- Compute the polynomial $r \in \mathbb{F}_{<m}[X]$ s.t. $r(x_j) = f(x_j)$.
- Compute the quotient $q(X) = (f(X) - r(X)) / \prod_{j=1}^m (X - x_j)$.
- Verifying q is a polynomial implies $f(x_j) = y_j$, for $j \in [m]$.

Multiple Polynomials: Open f_1, \dots, f_n at x .

- Compute the quotient $q_i(X) = (f_i(X) - y_i) / (X - x)$ for each $i \in [n]$.
- Mix all the resulting quotients with a random linear combination q .
- Verifying q is a polynomial implies each q_i is a polynomial, for $i \in [n]$.

Simple KZG Generalizations

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Generalization: Batch Openings and Multiple Polynomials ($\mathcal{P}_{\text{lonK}}$ Version) (*)

The Prover $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{F}, f_1, \dots, f_{n_1}, f'_1, \dots, f'_{n_2})$

$\text{commit}(\text{gp}, f_i, r_i) = [f_i(s)]_1$, for $i \in [n_1]$

$\text{commit}(\text{gp}, f'_i, r'_i) = [f'_i(s)]_1$, for $i \in [n_2]$

$$\frac{[f_1(s)]_1, \dots, [f_{n_1}(s)]_1}{[f'_1(s)]_1, \dots, [f'_{n_2}(s)]_1}$$

$$\xleftarrow{x, x'}$$

Computes $f_i(x) = y_i$ and $f'_i(x') = y'_i$

the polynomials:

$$q(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{n_1} \alpha^{i-1} \cdot \frac{f_i(x) - y_i}{x - \alpha}$$

$$q'(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{n_2} (\alpha')^{i-1} \cdot \frac{f'_i(x) - y'_i}{x - \alpha'}$$

and the proofs $\pi = [q(s)]_1$, $\pi' = [q'(s)]_1$

$$\frac{y_1, \dots, y_{n_1}, [q(s)]_1}{y'_1, \dots, y'_{n_2}, [q'(s)]_1}$$

The Verifier $\mathcal{V}(\mathcal{F})$

Samples evaluation challenges $x, x' \in \mathbb{F}$

Computes $[F(s)]_1 = \sum_{i=1}^{n_1} \alpha^{i-1} \cdot [f_i(s)]_1 + r \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{n_2} (\alpha')^{i-1} \cdot [f'_i(s)]_1$

and $Y = \sum_{i=1}^{n_1} \alpha^{i-1} \cdot y_i + r \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{n_2} (\alpha')^{i-1} \cdot y'_i$

Outputs accepts if:

$$e\left([q(s)]_1 + r \cdot [q'(s)]'_1, [s]_2\right) = e\left([F(s)]_1 - [Y]_1 + x \cdot [q(s)]_1 + r \cdot x \cdot [q'(s)]_1, [1]_2\right)$$

rejecting otherwise.

Theorem 2 (Worst case KZG Complexity)

Let $f_1, \dots, f_{n_1}, f'_1, \dots, f'_{n_2} \in \mathcal{F}$ be of degree $d - 1$ such that any of them have zero coefficients. The (n_1, n_2) -pols and $(1, 1)$ -openings version of the KZG polynomial commitment scheme has the following measures:

1. **Proving Time:** $(n_1 + n_2 + 2)d - 2$ escalar multiplications over \mathbb{G}_1 .
2. **Proof Size:** $(n_1 + n_2 + 2)$ \mathbb{G}_1 -elements and $(n_1 + n_2 + 2)$ \mathbb{F} -elements.
3. **Verification Time:** $(n_1 + n_2 + 2)$ escalar multiplications over \mathbb{G}_1 and 2 pairings.

- **Problem:** The verification complexity is dominated by the scalar multiplications performed over the \mathbb{G}_1 -elements in the proof.
- **Solution:** Reduce \mathbb{G}_1 -elements in the proof.

Some Previous Results i

- **Claim 1:** In general, $f(x_i) = y_i$ for $i \in [n]$ if and only if $q(X) = (f(X) - r(X))/Z_S(X)$ is a polynomial of degree $\deg(f) - |S|$.
- **Claim 2:** Even more general, $f(x_i) = y_i$ and $f'(x'_i) = y'_i$ for $i \in [n]$ if and only if $q(X) = (f(X) - r(X))/Z_S(X) + \alpha \cdot (f'(X) - r'(X))/Z_{S'}(X)$ is a polynomial of degree $d = \max\{\deg(f) - |S|, \deg(f') - |S'|\}$, where $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}$ is a uniformly sampled value.

Lemma 3 (shplon.κ [BDFG20])

$f(x_i) = y_i$ and $f'(x'_i) = y'_i$ for $i \in [n]$ if and only if the following polynomial is of degree d :

$$L(X) = \frac{Z_{S'}(y)(f(X) - r(y)) + \alpha \cdot Z_S(y)(f'(X) - r'(y)) - Z_{SS'}(y) \cdot q(X)}{X - y}$$

Put simply: Validating the $|S| + |S'|$ openings of q is equivalent to validating the opening at 0 of L (i.e., **the verifier complexity does not grow with the number of openings**).

Some Previous Results ii

- The **combine** $C: \mathbb{F}_{<d}[X]^t \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{<dt}[X]$ function is defined as follows:

$$C(f_1, \dots, f_t) := \sum_{i=1}^t f_i(X^t) \cdot X^{i-1}.$$


Lemma 4 (c-shplon \mathfrak{K} [GW21])

Opening $f_1, \dots, f_t \in \mathbb{F}[X]$ at $x \in \mathbb{F}$ is equivalent to opening C at the t -roots of x , that is, the t solutions of:


$$z^t = x \pmod{p}. \quad (1)$$

In fact, if $z \in \mathbb{F}$ is a solution of (1), then so are $z \cdot \omega_t^i$, for $i \in [t]$.

A Verifier-Friendly PCS: $c\text{-shplonR}$ i



A Verifier-Friendly PCS: $c\text{-shplonR}$ ii



A Verifier-Friendly PCS: $c\text{-shplonR}$ iii

| The Prover $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{F}, f_1, \dots, f_{n_1}, f'_1, \dots, f'_{n_2})$ | The Verifier $\mathcal{V}(\mathcal{F})$ |
|--|--|
| | $\xrightarrow{[q(s)]_1}$ |
| Reduction Round | |
| Compute the reduced polynomial: $L(X) = Z_{S'}(y)(C(X) - r(y)) + \alpha \cdot Z_S(y)(C'(X) - r'(y)) - Z_{SS'}(y) \cdot q(X)$ and the commitment $[W]_1 := [L(s)/(s - y)]_1$ | \xleftarrow{y} |
| | $\xrightarrow{[W]_1}$ |
| | Samples a reduction challenge $y \in \mathbb{F}$ Compute a), b) and c) as in \mathcal{P} 's batching round, obtaining the sets S, S' and the polynomials $r, r', Z_S, Z_{S'}$ Computes $[F(s)]_1 = Z_{S'}(y) [C]_1 + \alpha \cdot Z_S(y) [C']_1 - Z_{SS'}(y) \cdot [W]_1$ and $Y = r(y) + \alpha \cdot r'(y)$ Outputs accepts if: $e([W]_1, [s]_2) = e([F(s)]_1 - [Y]_1 + y \cdot [W]_1, [1]_2)$ rejecting otherwise. |

- Let $c_i = (n_i \cdot d + n_i - 1)$. Assume w.l.o.g. that $n_1 > n_2$ and that $c_1 - |S| > c_2 - |S'|$.

Theorem 5 (Worst case c-shplonK Complexity)

Let $f_1, \dots, f_{n_1}, f'_1, \dots, f'_{n_2} \in \mathcal{F}$ be of degree $d - 1$ such that any of them have zero coefficients. The (n_1, n_2) -pols and $(1, 1)$ -openings version of the c-shplonK polynomial commitment scheme has the following measures:

1. **Proving Time:** $3c_1 + c_2 - 2|S|$ escalar multiplications over \mathbb{G}_1 .
2. **Proof Size:** 4 \mathbb{G}_1 -elements and $(n_1 + n_2 + 4)$ \mathbb{F} -elements.
3. **Verification Time:** 4 escalar multiplications over \mathbb{G}_1 and 2 pairings.

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A Useful Observation

- The **combine** $C: \mathbb{F}_{<d}[X]^t \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{<dt}[X]$ function is defined as follows:

$$C(f_1, \dots, f_t) := \sum_{i=1}^t f_i(X^t) \cdot X^{i-1}.$$

- Let $f, g, h \in \mathbb{F}_{<4}[X]$. To obtain **commit**(gp, C) observe that computing $f(X^t) \cdot X^i$ is a “multiply-index-by- t ” (except for zero) followed by “shift-index-by- i ”:

$$\begin{aligned} f(X^3) &= [f_0, 0, 0, f_1, 0, 0, f_2, 0, 0, f_4, 0, 0] \\ g(X^3) \cdot X &= [0, g_0, 0, 0, g_1, 0, 0, g_2, 0, 0, g_4, 0] \\ h(X^3) \cdot X^2 &= [0, 0, h_0, 0, 0, h_1, 0, 0, h_2, 0, 0, h_4] \end{aligned}$$

and moreover:

- $\text{commit}(C) = \text{commit}(f(X^3)) + \text{commit}(g(X^3)X) + \text{commit}(h(X^3)X^2)$ takes 15 scalar multiplications and 2 additions.
- $\text{commit}(C) = \text{commit}(f(X^3) + g(X^3)X + h(X^3)X^2)$ takes 15 scalar multiplications.
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
Verifier Field Inversions

- Say that the verifier needs to perform the inversion of $x_1, \dots, x_n \in \mathbb{F}$.
- Using Montgomery batch inversion we can convert the n inversions to 1 (16.000 gas) inversion and $3 \cdot (n - 1)$ multiplications.
- **Problem:** The verifier still needs to perform 1 inversion.
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Verifier Field Inversions

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Zerofier Division i

- Let $T = S_0 \cup S_1 \cup S_2$ where:

$$S_0 = h_0\langle\omega_0\rangle, \quad S_1 = h_1\langle\omega_1\rangle, \quad S_2 = h_2\langle\omega_2\rangle \cup h_3\langle\omega_2\rangle$$

where $h_0^{|S_0|} = h_1^{|S_1|} = h_2^{|S_2|/2} = \mathfrak{z}$, $h_3^{|S_2|/2} = \mathfrak{z}\omega$ and $\omega_0, \omega_1, \omega_2, \omega$ are primitive roots of unity.

- In Round 4, we should divide a polynomial $f \in \mathbb{F}[X]$ of degree $\geq |T|$ by the zerofier over T :

$$Z_T(X) := \prod_{z \in T} (X - z)$$

- Naive polynomial long division would take (unparallelizable) $O(|T|^2)$ time. **Let's do it better!**

Zerofier Division ii

We start by noticing that:

$$Z_T(X) = Z_{S_0}(X) \cdot Z_{S_1}(X) \cdot Z_{S_2}(X) = (X^{|S_0|} - \mathfrak{z}) \cdot (X^{|S_1|} - \mathfrak{z}) \cdot (X^{|S_2|} - \mathfrak{z}(1 + \omega)X^{|S_2|/2} + \mathfrak{z}^2\omega).$$

Then, we (sequentially) proceed as follows:

1. Divide f by Z_{S_0} to obtain the polynomial q_0 such that $q_0(X) \cdot Z_{S_0}(X) = f(X)$.
2. Divide q_0 by Z_{S_1} to obtain the polynomial q_1 such that $q_1(X) \cdot Z_{S_1}(X) = q_0(X)$.
3. Split $Z_{S_2}(X) = (X^{|S_2|} - \mathfrak{z}(1 + \omega)X^{|S_2|/2} + \mathfrak{z}^2\omega)$ as the multiplication of the two inner zerofiers $(X^{|S_2|/2} - \mathfrak{z})$ and $(X^{|S_2|/2} - \mathfrak{z}\omega)$.

Then:

- a) Divide q_1 by $(X^{|S_2|/2} - \mathfrak{z})$ to obtain the polynomial q_2 s.t. $q_2(X) \cdot (X^{|S_2|/2} - \mathfrak{z}) = q_1(X)$.
- b) Divide q_2 by $(X^{|S_2|/2} - \mathfrak{z}\omega)$ to obtain the polynomial q_3 s.t. $q_3(X) \cdot (X^{|S_2|/2} - \mathfrak{z}\omega) = q_2(X)$.

The polynomial q_3 satisfies $q_3(X) \cdot Z_T(X) = f(X)$.

Division by $X^m - \beta$ (*) i

Lemma 6

Given a polynomial $f(X) = f_d X^d + \dots + f_1 X + f_0 \in \mathbb{F}[X]$ of degree $d \geq m$ and a field element β , the quotient of the division $f(X)/(X^m - \beta)$ is the polynomial:

$$\begin{aligned} q(X) := & \left[f_d \cdot X^{d-m} + f_{d-1} \cdot X^{(d-1)-m} + \dots + f_{d-(m-1)} \cdot X^{(d-(m-1))-m} \right] + \\ & + \left[(f_{d-m} + f_d \cdot \beta) \cdot X^{(d-m)-m} + \dots + (f_{d-(2m-1)} + f_{d-(m-1)} \cdot \beta) \cdot X^{(d-(2m-1))-m} \right] + \\ & + \left[(f_{d-2m} + f_{d-m} \cdot \beta + f_d \cdot \beta^2) \cdot X^{(d-2m)-m} + \dots \right. \\ & \left. + (f_{d-(3m-1)} + f_{d-(2m-1)} \cdot \beta + f_{d-(m-1)} \cdot \beta^2) \cdot X^{(d-(3m-1))-m} \right] + \dots \end{aligned}$$

Division by $X^m - \beta$ (*) ii

- In words, q is a polynomial with the m leading coefficients equal to the m leading coefficients of f ; the following m coefficients are of the form $f_i + f_j \cdot \beta$, with $j - i = m$; the following m coefficients are of the form $f_i + f_j \cdot \beta + f_k \cdot \beta^2$, with $j - i = k - j = m$; and so on.
- For instance, if $f(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{10} f_i X^i$ and $m = 2$, then:

$$\begin{aligned} q(X) := & f_{10}X^8 + f_9X^7 + (f_8 + f_{10}\beta)X^6 + (f_7 + f_9\beta)X^5 + \\ & + (f_6 + f_8\beta + f_{10}\beta^2)X^4 + (f_5 + f_7\beta + f_9\beta^2)X^3 + \\ & + (f_4 + f_6\beta + f_8\beta^2 + f_{10}\beta^3)X^2 + (f_3 + f_5\beta + f_7\beta^2 + f_9\beta^3)X + \\ & + (f_2 + f_4\beta + f_6\beta^2 + f_8\beta^3 + f_{10}\beta^4) \end{aligned}$$

- This division is 100% parallelizable.

Adding Zero-Knowledge (with Dummy Gates) i

- In $\mathcal{P}_{\text{on}}\mathcal{K}$, in the order for the protocol to be zero-knowledge, the authors add to the witness polynomials a blinding polynomial $b \in \mathbb{F}[X]$ as follows:

$$a(X) := b(X)Z_H(X) + \sum_{i=1}^n w_i \cdot L_i(X).$$

- This strategy ends up defining polynomials with degree $n + \deg(b)$, which is inefficient for practical scenarios in which n is a power of two.
- To avoid this issue, we instead sample $b_1, b_2 \in \mathbb{F}$ and compute:

$$a(X) := \sum_{i=1}^{n-2} w_i L_i(X) + b_1 L_{n-1}(X) + b_2 L_n(X).$$

Notice that now a has degree lower than n .

Adding Zero-Knowledge (with Dummy Gates) ii

- However, for the permutation polynomial we do it in the standard way:


$$z(X) := (b_7X^2 + b_8X + b_9)Z_H(X) + L_1(X) + \sum_{i=1}^{n_1} \left(L_{i+1}(X) \prod_{j=1}^i \frac{(w_j + \beta\omega^j + \gamma)(w_{n+j} + \beta k_1\omega^j + \gamma)(w_{2n+j} + \beta k_2\omega^j + \gamma)}{(w_j + \beta\sigma^*(j) + \gamma)(w_{n+j} + \beta\sigma^*(n+j) + \gamma)(w_{2n+j} + \beta\sigma^*(2n+j) + \gamma)} \right)$$

- In \mathcal{K} , every constraint adds an n factor to the prover time.
- If done with the dummy gates strategy, we would have needed to add the following constraint:




$$L_{n-1}(X)(z(X) - 1) = 0$$

to ensure the correctness of the permutation.

Tradeoff between \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} running times in fflonK



Thank you for your attention!

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